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NOTES
Corporations -

Piercing the Corporate Veil

Allied Chemical Corporation brought an action against Bell Oil & Gas
Company for the debts of Mid-Tex Development Company and Apollo
Oil Company.' Mid-Tex was an affiliate and Apollo was a subsidiary of
Bell. The directorships of all three corporations were intermingled,' and
the ownership of both Apollo and Mid-Tex was either directly or indirectly held by the principals in Bell.' The trial court found no fraudulent
representations or activity and no conspiracy or joint venture between Bell
and its subsidiary or its affiliate, but the court held that Bell was liable on
the ground that Bell had used its control and ownership of Apollo and
Mid-Tex to make those companies its agents.

The court of civil appeals affirmed on the basis that the financing of the
affiliate and the subsidiary was insufficient, that the management barriers
between Bell, Apollo, and Mid-Tex were not sufficiently maintained, and
that the corporate structures of Mid-Tex and Apollo were "mere dummies." 4 Held, reversed: The corporate entity should not be disregarded unless the corporate structure is used "to perpetuate fraud, to avoid personal
liability, to avoid the effect of a statute, or in a few other exceptional situations." Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336
(Tex. 1968).
I.

THE THEORY FOR PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL

The Legal Entity Concept. The corporation is a desirable business organization because it provides limited liability, unlimited and continued life,
and opportunity to raise capital through the sale of stock.' Thus, courts
will not disregard this fictional legal entity without sufficient reason.' It is
reasonably certain that ownership of one corporation by another or ownership of a corporation by one or two persons is not sufficient to justify disregard of the corporate entity.! But where the purpose for which the corporation was created has been clearly abused by obvious dominion and
control over the corporation by the parties for their own personal interests, the court is more likely to disregard the corporate entity. Where it is
not clear what degree of control has been exercised by the parties, the
' The liability in question was for petroleum products advanced to Mid-Tex and Apollo on
open account by Allied Chemical Corporation.
2 Lubell and Rothstein were the executive vice president and vice president respectively of
Bell .nd were directors in Mid-Tex while serving also as its assistant treasurer and assistant secretary, respectively. Apollo Oil was run by the officers of Mid-Tex which included Lubell and Rothstein.
' Fifty-one per cent of the stock of Mid-Tex was owned by Lubell and Company, a firm solely
owned by Lubell and Rothstein, who also owned the majority of Bell stock. All of the Apollo
stock was owned by Bell.
4
Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 420 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
5 See 18 AM. JuR. 2D Corporations § 13

(1965).

'Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALIF. L. Ruv. 12
(1925).
Id. See also Sutton v. Reagan & Gee, 405 "S.W.2d 828,' 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error ref.
ti.r.e.; Sayers v. Navillus Oil Co., 41 S.W.2d 506 (rex. Civ. App. 1931), error ref.
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court has to rely upon its own ideas of honesty and justice to resolve the
dilemma.' The courts have had difficulty in characterizing this dilemma
and in formulating factors sufficient to justify a piercing of the corporate veil.
Factors for Piercing. Two approaches to the dilemma of formulating the
factors required to pierce the corporate veil have been advanced. In a 1929

article,' Justice Douglas set out four standards which he felt should be
maintained between a parent corporation and a subsidiary or between a
corporation and an individual: (1) separate, well-balanced financial structures; (2) separate operations and business records; (3) separate management structures; and (4) representations of separate identities."0 Justice
Douglas argued that if one of the indicia breaks down the corporate veil
should be disregarded. If more than one of the standards is not maintained
the case for piercing is stronger.
In addition, a "two-pronged" test has been advanced for determining
when to pierce the corporate veil. 1 The first portion involves a showing of
virtual identity between an individual and a corporation or between two
corporations. This prong seems to be the equivalent of the test advanced
by Justice Douglas. The second prong requires a showing that if the activity causing virtual identity is allowed to continue, inequity and disruption of the purpose of the legal entity will result. In advancing the twopronged test, the commentator provided sample pleadings" which he felt
'Berkley v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
'Douglas, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193
(1929).
"5 Id. at 196-97. The four standards are:
(1) A separate financial unit should be set up and maintained. That unit should
be sufficiently financed so as to carry the normal strains upon it. (2) The day to day
business of the two units should be kept separate. And in addition the financial and
business records of the two units should be separately kept. (3) The formal barriers
between the two management structures should be maintained. The ritual of separate
meetings should be religiously observed. The activities of the individuals serving
on the two boards can be tagged so that the individuals qua directors of the subsidiary can always be distinguished from the same individuals qua directors of the
parent. Such tagging is not pure fiction. It draws the line that keeps the dual
capacities separate and distinct. It conforms to the habit of thought which accepts
the fact of dual capacity but which demands a separation of conduct so that each
act may be clearly categorized. Separate meetings of the boards are sufficient.
The same problem arises in connection with the officers. And the same solution
suggests itself. A man may not be indiscriminately one officer or another. The observance of the niceties of business efficiency are normally sufficient. Such demands
are not exacting. They merely suffice to keep the record of the business affairs of the
two units from becoming hopelessly intermingled. (4) The two units should not be
represented as being one unit. Those with whom they come in contact should be
kept sufficiently informed of their separate identities.
sa Kaufer, Pleading Facts Sufficient To Disregard the Corporate Entity, 40 Los ANGELES BAR
BULL. 131, 148 (1965).
'"Id. Mr. Kaufer believes that the following pleadings are necessary to show identity of corporate units or of individuals and corporate units. None of the pleadings alone is sufficient to
show identity but seemingly all must be pleaded and proven.
(a) defendants John and Mary Doe at all times herein mentioned were and now
are the owners and holders of all of the stock of defendant Doe Corporation; or:
defendant Doe Corporation never issued stock or applied for a permit to issue stock;
(b) defendants John and Mary Doe at all times herein mentioned were and now
are the only officers and directors of Doe Corporation; [or, control the officers and
directors of Doe Corporation]; (c) defendants John and Mary Doe caused Doe
Corporation to be formed and to conduct business without adequate capitalization;

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

I[Vol. 2 3

would establish identity and dictate piercing if inequity also could be
shown.
Piercing the Corporate Veil in Texas. Extenuating circumstances must be
present in order to justify disregarding the corporate entity in Texas, 3
but Texas courts have not agreed as to what these circumstances are.
Early Texas decisions established that disregard of the corporate entity
was justified upon a showing that the corporation was being used as (1)
a means to perpetrate fraud, (2) a "tool" or "business conduit" of another corporation, (3) a means to achieve a monopoly, (4) a vehicle for
circumventing a statute, (5) a protection from crime, or (6) a justification of a wrong." However, a few years later the list was limited to the
perpetration of fraud and a justification of a wrong."
The courts continued to vacillate over the problem, and in 1945, in
State v. Swift d Co.," the early list of circumstances justifying piercing
with some additions and subtractions was reaffirmed. However, the court
seemed to indicate that more than a showing of one of the enumerated
inequities was required to justify piercing. Thus the court, in addition to
specifying the list of inequities, noted four guidelines for determining the
identity of parties.' The court said that to avoid piercing, a corporate
entity operated in conjunction with another corporation must display a
separation of finances, of day-to-day business activity, and of management, and representations must not have been made which indicated that
the two corporations were one. Thus the court apparently adopted the
two-pronged approach, employing a set of guidelines to determine identity of corporate forms (the first prong) and specifying a list of inequities
(the second prong).
However, any implied adoption of a type of two-prong test in Texas
was soon negated. In 1955 the Texas supreme court held that piercing
was possible if a corporation were being used to perpetrate a fraud, avoid
a statute, or create some other exceptional situation.'8 Therefore, the
(d) no meetings of stockholders or election for directors of Doe Corporation was
ever held; (e) defendants John and Mary Doe own and control all of the assets
of Doe Corporation; and (f) defendants John and Mary Doe paid personal debts
with funds belonging to Doe Corporation.
Id. at 154-55. See Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961);
Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 335 P.2d 107 (1959); Automtriz v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d
792, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (1957); Plott v. Billingley, 234 Cal. App. 2d 577, 44 Cal. Rptr. 476, 480
(1965); Rosen v. Losch, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 2d 324, 44 Cal. Rptr. 377, 382 (1965); People
v. Clauson, 231 Cal. App. 2d 374, 41 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1964); Loughran v. Reynolds, 70 Cal.
App. 2d 241,

160 P.2d 904

(1961); Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 428, 308 P.2d

428, 431 (1957); Taylor v. Newton, 117 Cal. App. 2d 752, 257 P.2d 68
AM.

JuR. PL.

&

Pa. FOAMS

Corporations 6:764-:766

(1957);

18

(1953).

AM. JuR.

2D

See also 6
Corporations

14 nn.13, 14 (1965).
S Pelletier, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 134 (1967).
14Pacific Am. Gasoline Co. v. Miller, 76 S.W.2d 833, 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), error ref.;

Continental Supply Co. v. Forest E. Gilmore Co., 55 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), error
dismissed; Williams v. Freeport Sulphur Co., 40 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).

lSFirst Nat'l Bank v. Gamble, 134 Tex. 112, 132 S.W.2d 100 (1939).
16187 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), error ref.
" Id. at 134. These indicia were originally enunciated by Justice Douglas. See Douglas, Insula-

tion from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 196-97 (1929).
"SPace Corp. v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 195, 284 S.W.2d 340, 351 (1955).
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court retreated somewhat to the original list of requisites for piercing"
and seemed to apply only the inequity portion of the two-pronged test.
Many Texas "piercing" cases have been decided in the last year. The
courts have not mentioned a two-pronged test and have generally pierced
only upon a clear showing that at least one of the court-approved list of
inequities was present °
II. BELL OIL & GAS Co. v. ALLIED CHEMICAL CORP.

In Bell the court of civil appeals determined that identity existed between Bell and Mid-Tex and between Bell and Apollo. 1 Therefore, the
court, looking to the standards set forth by Justice Douglas, freely pierced
the corporate veil. However, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed because there was no showing that any of the court-approved inequities
existed.2" There was no evidence of incorporation for an illegal purpose,
and since business units rather than individuals were involved, there was
no question of personal avoidance of liability by use of the corporate
form. The issue of fraud was considered by the court, but it concluded
that all statements of the Bell directors were made before the issuance of
credit for petroleum products purchases by Mid-Tex and Apollo. Even
though some statements of guarantee had been made, the court found no
statements or representations by Bell upon which Allied had relied in issuing its credit. Thus the supreme court disaffirmed the piercing of a corporate veil upon the mere showing of identity of corporate structures,
with no showing of inequity.
Even though the court was reluctant to pierce the corporate veil absent
a showing that a fraud had been perpetrated, that a personal liability had
been avoided, or that a statute had been avoided by the use of the corporate structure, it emphasized that piercing would still be allowed in certain "other exceptional cases." 23 However, no indication was given as to
what these situations might be. The court said nothing of a two-pronged
test, but it implied that the elements of identity and inequity were necessary to justify piercing the corporate veil. Furthermore, the court seemingly was not ready to narrow the issue of when to pierce, for no standards were enumerated to form a legal basis for piercing.
III. CONCLUSION
It is not certain what Bell means or will mean to the Texas law of piercing the corporate veil. One view is that the court, in disallowing piercing,
was merely balancing the equities of the case. Under this view the requiSee note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
5
' Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1962); Western Rock Co. v. Davis,
432 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Sapphire Homes, Inc. v. Gilbert, 426 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1968), error ref.; Sutton v. Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966),
error ref. n.r.e. See also Pelletier, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 134
(1967).
2
Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 420 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
2
Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968).
'sld. at 340.
19

